INTRODUCTION
A lattice L is the set of all integer combinations of linearly independent basis vectors b 1 , . . . ,
We call n the rank of the lattice L and d the dimension or the ambient dimension of the lattice L.
The Shortest Vector Problem (SVP) takes as input a basis for a lattice L ⊂ R d and r > 0 and asks us to decide whether the shortest non-zero vector in L has length at most r . Typically, we define length in terms of the ℓ p norm for some 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, defined as ∥x
for finite p and ∥x ∥ ∞ := max |x i | .
In particular, the ℓ 2 norm is the familiar Euclidean norm, and it is the most interesting case from our perspective. We write SVP p for SVP in the ℓ p norm (and just SVP when we do not wish to specify a norm). Starting with the breakthrough work of Lenstra, Lenstra, and Lovász in 1982 [28] , algorithms for solving SVP in both its exact and approximate forms have found innumerable applications, including factoring polynomials over the rationals [28] , integer programming [15, 25, 29] , cryptanalysis [24, 38, 41, 48] , etc. More recently, many cryptographic primitives have been constructed whose security is based on the (worst-case) hardness of SVP or closely related lattice problems (e.g., [7, 19, 43, 45] ). Such latticebased cryptographic constructions are likely to be used on massive scales (e.g., as part of the TLS protocol) in the not-too-distant future (see, e.g., [40] and the many references therein).
Most of the above applications rely on approximate variants of SVP with rather large approximation factors (e.g., the relevant approximation factors are polynomial in n for most cryptographic constructions). However, the best known algorithms for the approximate variant of SVP use an algorithm for exact SVP 2 over lower-rank lattices as a subroutine [18, 37, 47] . So, the complexity of the exact problem is of particular interest. We briefly discuss some of what is known below.
Algorithms for SVP. Most of the asymptotically fastest known algorithms for SVP are variants of the celebrated randomized sieving algorithm due to Ajtai, Kumar, and Sivakumar [8] , which solved SVP p in 2 O (d ) time for p = 2 and p = ∞. This was extended to all ℓ p norms [13] , then to SVP in all norms [10] , and then even to "norms" whose unit balls are not necessarily symmetric [15] . These 2 O (d ) -time algorithms that work in all norms in particular imply 2 O (n) · poly(d )-time algorithms for SVP p , by taking the ambient space to be the span of the lattice. (Furthermore, in the most important case of p = 2, we may assume without loss of generality that n = d. We therefore focus almost entirely on running times in terms of the rank n and largely ignore the ambient dimension d.)
In the special case of p = 2, quite a bit of work has gone into improving the constant in the exponent in these 2 O (n) -time algorithms [30, 36, 39, 44] . The current fastest known algorithm for SVP 2 runs in 2 n+o (n) time [1, 4] . But, this is unlikely to be the end of the story. Indeed, there is also a 2 n/2+o (n) -time algorithm that approximates SVP 2 up to a small constant factor, 1 and there is some reason to believe that this algorithm can be modified to solve the exact problem [1, 4] . Further complicating the situation, there exist even faster "heuristic algorithms," whose correctness has not been proven but can be shown under certain heuristic assumptions [27, 39, 52] . The fastest such heuristic algorithm runs in time (3/2) n/2+o (n) ≈ 2 0.29n [11] .
Hardness of SVP. Van Emde Boas first asked whether SVP p was NP hard in 1981, and he proved NP hardness in the special case when p = ∞ [50] . Despite much work, his question went unanswered until 1998, when Ajtai showed NP hardness of SVP p for finite p [6] . A series of works then simplified the reduction and extended it to the approximate variant of SVP p [14, 22, 26, 33, 34] . We now know that SVP p is NP hard to approximate to within any constant factor and hard to approximate to within approximation factors as large as n c / log log n under reasonable complexity-theoretic assumptions. 2 However, such hardness proofs tell us very little about the quantitative or fine-grained complexity of SVP p . E.g., does the fastest possible algorithm for SVP 2 still run in time at least, say, 2 n/5 , or is there an algorithm that runs in time 2 n/20 or even 2 √ n ? The above hardness results do not formally distinguish between these cases, but we certainly need to be confident in our answers to such questions if we plan to base the security of widespread cryptosystems on these answers. Indeed, most proposed instantiations of lattice-based cryptosystems (i.e., proposed cryptosystems that specify a key size) can essentially be broken by solving SVP 2 with, say, n ≪ 600 (by reducing the approximate case in potentially higher dimensions to the exact case with n ≪ 600) or SVP p for any p with n ≪ 1500. So, if we discovered an algorithm running in time, say, 2 n/20 -time for SVP 2 or 2 n/50 or 2 n/ log 2 n for SVP p , then these schemes would be completely broken in practice. (See [9] for a survey of proposed lattice-based cryptographic schemes and tighter security estimates.) And, given the large number of recent algorithmic advances, one might (reasonably?) worry that such algorithms will be found. We would therefore very much like to rule out this possibility! To rule out such algorithms, we typically rely on a fine-grained complexity-theoretic hypothesis-such as the Strong Exponential Table 1 : Summary of known fine-grained upper and lower bounds for SVP p for various p under various assumptions, with new results in blue (i.e., all lower bounds for finite p). Lower bounds in bold also apply for some constant approximation factor strictly greater than one, and the lower bound with a * uses a non-uniform reduction. The SETHbased lower bound only applies for "almost all" p > p 0 , in the sense of Theorem 4.3.
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Time Hypothesis (SETH, see Section 2.3) or the Exponential Time Hypothesis (ETH). To that end, Bennett, Golovnev, and StephensDavidowitz recently showed quantitative hardness results for the Closest Vector Problem in ℓ p norms (CVP p ) [12] , which is a close relative of SVP p that is known to be at least as hard [21] . In particular, assuming SETH, [12] showed that there is no 2 (1−ε )n -time algorithm for CVP p or SVP ∞ for any ε > 0 and "almost all" 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ (not including p = 2). Under ETH, [12] showed that there is no 2 o (n) -time algorithm for CVP p for any 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞. We prove similar results for SVP p .
Our Results
We now present our results, which are also summarized in Table 1 .
SETH hardness using the integer lattice. Our first main result essentially gives an explicit constant C p > 1 for each p > p 0 ≈ 2.1397 such that, under (randomized) SETH, there is no algorithm for SVP p that runs in time better than 2 n/C p . The constants p 0 and C p do not have a closed form, but they are easily computable to high precision in practice. (E.g., p 0 = 2.13972134795007 . . ., C 3 = 3.01717780317660 . . ., and C 5 = 1.3018669052709 . . ..) We plot C p over a wide range of p in Figure 1 . Notice that C p is unbounded as p approaches p 0 , but it is a relatively small constant for, say, p ≳ 3.
We present this result informally here, as the actual statement is rather technical. In particular, because we use the theorem from [12] that only applies to "almost all" p, our result also has this property. (E.g., the result as stated holds up to a factor of 2 o (n) in the running time for all but countably many p > p 0 , including all odd integers p ≥ 3 but excluding even integers. See Theorem 4.3.) Theorem 1.1 (Informal). For "almost all" p > p 0 ≈ 2.1397 (including all odd integers p ≥ 3), there is no 2 n/C p -time algorithm for SVP p unless (randomized) SETH is false, where C p > 1 is as in Figure 1 . Furthermore, C p → 1 as p → ∞.
To prove this theorem, we give a (randomized) reduction from the CVP p instances created by the reduction of [12] to SVP p that only increases the rank of the lattice by a constant factor. As we describe in Section 1.2, our reduction is surprisingly simple. In particular, the key step in Khot's reduction [26] 
, and r † := n 1/p /2. I.e., our gadget is simply the integer lattice with the all-halves point as a target. For p > p 0 , L † has many more vectors in an ℓ p ball of radius r † around t † than it does in the centered ℓ p ball of radius r † . I.e., L † "has many more close vectors than short vectors, " which is the main property that we need to make our reduction go through. (Indeed, as we will discuss in detail in Section 1.3, all hardness results for SVP p known to the authors for finite p use such a gadget, e.g., [6, 14, 26, 33, 34] .) To obtain (Gap/S)ETH hardness results we need this ratio to be exponential in n † . (To simply show NP hardness, we would only need 2 poly(n † ) .)
We note in passing that we actually do not need the full strength of SETH. We can instead rely on the analogous assumption for Max-k-SAT, which is potentially weaker. (We inherit this property directly from [12] . See Section 4.)
Gap-ETH Hardness for p > 2. Our second main result is the Gap-ETH hardness of SVP p for all p > 2. 3 In fact, we prove this even for the problem of approximating SVP p up to some fixed constant 3 Gap-ETH is the assumption that there is no 2 o (n) -time algorithm that distinguishes a satisfiable 3-SAT formula from one in which at most a constant fraction of the clauses γ p > 1 depending only on p (and the approximation factor implicit in the Gap-ETH assumption). 4 Theorem 1.2 (Informal). For any p > 2, there is no 2 o (n) -time algorithm for SVP p unless (randomized) Gap-ETH is false. Furthermore, for each such p there is a constant γ p > 1 such that the same result holds even for γ p -approximate SVP p .
Our reduction again uses the integer lattice as our gadget (with a different target and radius), and we again rely on the key property of "having exponentially many more close vectors than short vectors, " though this takes quite a bit more work to prove in this case. Indeed, we show that the existence of such a gadget is sufficient for proving Gap-ETH hardness in the ℓ p norm. While the use of such gadgets is ubiquitous in prior work (e.g., [6, 14, 26, 33, 34] ; see Section 1.3), we show that they are actually sufficient to prove hardness, and we hope that this result proves useful for other authors. 5 We note in passing that for this result (as well as Theorem 1.3 and Corollary 1.4), we actually rule out even 2 o (d ) -time algorithms. However, we focus on the rank n instead of the dimension d for simplicity. We make no attempt to compute the constants γ p or the implicit constants in the 2 Ω(n) lower bound on the running time, as they are likely very far from the truth.
Gap-ETH Hardness for 1 ≤ p ≤ 2 via Lattices with Large Kissing Number. Unfortunately, we cannot use the integer lattice as a gadget for p ≤ 2. However, we are able to use a very recent breakthrough result of Vlăduţ to construct a gadget in the Euclidean p = 2 case [51] . In particular, Vlăduţ showed the existence of a family of lattices with exponentially large kissing number-i.e., for each n, there is a lattice with 2 Ω(n) non-zero vectors with minimal ℓ 2 norm. We use a relatively simple technique to construct a suitable gadget out of such a lattice, allowing us to prove Gap-ETH hardness of SVP 2 . 6 Theorem 1.3 (Informal). There is no 2 o (n) -time algorithm for SVP 2 unless (non-uniform) Gap-ETH is false. Furthermore, there exists a constant γ > 1 such that the same result holds even for γ -approximate SVP 2 .
In fact, Regev and Rosen show that ℓ 2 is essentially the "easiest ℓ p norm" [46] . In particular, to show that SVP p is Gap-ETH hard for all 1 ≤ p ≤ 2, it suffices to show it for p = 2. From this, we derive the following. (See the [3] for the formal statement.)
are simultaneously satisfiable. See Section 2.3. We informally call a problem Gap-ETH hard if Gap-ETH implies that there is no 2 o (n) -time algorithm for that problem. 4 We note that Khot claimed in Section 8 of [26] that he had discovered a linear reduction from γ ′ -approximate CVP p to 2 1−3/p -approximate SVP p for p ≥ 4 and some unspecified constant γ ′ . However, it is not clear whether γ ′ is a small enough constant to yield an alternate proof of Theorem 1.2 for p ≥ 4. In particular, one would need to show Gap-ETH hardness of γ ′ -approximate CVP p , which still seems out of reach for γ ′ larger than some small constant.
Furthermore, for each 1 ≤ p ≤ 2, there exists a constant γ p > 1 such that the same result holds even for γ p -approximate SVP p .
Unfortunately, our reduction is non-uniform. Indeed, even if we were able to construct Vlăduţ's lattices efficiently (which might be possible), we would still require additional advice to convert such a lattice into a suitable gadget. See [3] for sufficient conditions to make the reduction non-uniform.
Khot's Reduction Before we describe our own techniques, it will be useful to review Khot's elegant reduction from CVP p to SVP p [26] . We do our best throughout this description to hide technicalities in an effort to focus on the high-level simplicity of Khot's reduction. 7 (Since the hardness of SVP p went unproven from when van Emde Boas proposed the problem in 1982 [50] to when Ajtai gave the first proof in 1998 [6] , this simplicity is truly remarkable.) We focus on Khot's reduction because it is the most similar to our own, but we note that other reductions use similar ideas as well. (E.g., [6, 14, 33, 34] . See Section 1.3 for more discussion.)
First, some basic definitions and notation. For a lattice L ⊂ R d and 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞, we write
∥y ∥ p for the length of the shortest non-zero vector in L in the ℓ p norm. For a target vector t ∈ R d , we write
for the distance between t and L. For any radius r > 0, we write
for the number of lattice vectors within distance r of t.
Recall that CVP p is the problem that takes as input a lattice L ⊂ R d , target vector t ∈ R d , and distance r > 0 and asks us to distinguish the YES case when dist p (t, L) ≤ r from the NO case when dist p (t, L) > r . When talking about a particular CVP p instance, we naturally call a lattice vector y ∈ L with ∥y − t ∥ p ≤ r a close vector, and we notice that the number of close vectors is N p (L, r, t ).
The Naive Reduction and Sparsification. The "naive reduction" from CVP p to SVP p simply takes a CVP p instance consisting of a lattice L ⊂ R d with basis B ∈ R d ×n , target t ∈ R d , and distance r > 0 and constructs the SVP p instance given by the basis of a lattice L ′ of the form
where s > 0 is some parameter depending on the CVP p instance. Notice that, if y ∈ L is a close vector (i.e., ∥y − t ∥ ≤ r ), then ∥(y −t, s)∥ p p ≤ r p +s p . Therefore, in the YES case when there exists a vector close to t, we will have λ
(This basic technique goes back at least to Kannan [25] , and is ubiquitous in reductions from inhomogeneous lattice problems to homogeneous lattice problems.)
However, in the NO case there might still be non-zero vectors y ′ ∈ L ′ \ {0} whose length is less than r ′ . These vectors must be of the form y ′ = (y − zt, zs) for some integer z ±1. Let us for now only consider the case z = 0, in which case these vectors are in one-to-one correspondence with the non-zero vectors in L of length less than r ′ . We naturally call these short vectors.
Khot showed that a (randomized) reduction exists if we just assume that the number of close vectors in any YES case is significantly larger than the number of short vectors in any NO case. In particular, Khot showed that we can randomly "sparsify" the lattice L ′ to obtain a sublattice L ′′ such that each of the short non-zero vectors in L ′ stays in L ′′ with probability 1/q where q ≥ 2 is some parameter that we can choose. So, if we take q to be significantly smaller than the number of close vectors in the YES case but significantly larger than the number of short vectors in the NO case, we can show that the resulting lattice will have λ
1 (L) > r ′ in the NO case with high probability. Unfortunately, the CVP p instances produced by most hardness reductions typically have 2 Ω(n) short vectors, and they might only have one close vector in the YES case. So, if we want this reduction to work, we will need some way to increase this ratio by an exponential factor.
Adding the Gadget. To increase the ratio of close vectors to short vectors, Khot uses a certain gadget that is itself a CVP
is a lattice with basis B † , t † ∈ R d † is a target vector, and r † > 0 is some distance. He then takes the direct sum of the two instances. I.e., Khot considers the lattice
with basis
, and the distance r := (r p +(r † ) p ) 1/p . We wish to apply the sparsification-based reduction described above to this new lattice. So, we proceed to make some observations about L † to deduce some properties that it must have in order to make this reduction sufficient to derive our hardness results.
First, we simply notice that the rank of L = L ⊕ L † is the sum of the ranks of L and L † . To prove the kind of fine-grained hardness results that we are after, we are only willing to increase the rank by a constant factor, so the rank of L † must be at most O (n). (In prior work, including Khot's, authors were content with a rank of poly(n).)
Next, we notice that any y = (y, y † ) ∈ L with ∥y − t ∥ p ≤ r and ∥y † − t † ∥ p ≤ r † satisfies ∥ y − t ∥ p ≤ r . We call these good vectors, and we notice that there are at least N p (L † , r † , t † ) good vectors in the YES case. Now, we worry about short vectors in L in the NO case, i.e., non-zero y = (y, y † ) with ∥ y ∥ p ≤ r . Clearly, y will be short if ∥y ∥ p ≤ r and ∥y † ∥ p ≤ r † . Therefore, the number of short vectors
where we have used the fact that n † = O (n) and the fact that the input CVP p instances that interest us have 2 Ω(n) short vectors.
(This is not true in general, but it is true of most CVP p instances resulting from hardness proofs.) Since the number of good vectors in the YES case is potentially only N p (L † , r † , t † ), our gadget lattice must satisfy
Though this in itself is not sufficient to make Khot's reduction work, it is the most important feature that a gadget lattice must have. Indeed, we show in [3] that any gadget satisfying Eq. (1) implies the existence of a gadget that is strong enough to make Khot's reduction work. (This property and various variants are sometimes called local density, and they play a key role in many hardness proofs for SVP p , as we discuss in Section 1.3.) However, short vectors are no longer our only concern. We also have to worry about close vectors that are not good vectors, i.e., vectors y = (y, y † ) in the NO case such that ∥ y − t ∥ p ≤ r but ∥y − t ∥ p > r . We call such vectors impostors. Impostors certainly can exist in general, but our sparsification procedure will work on them just like any other vector. So, as long as our gadget lattice is chosen such that the number of impostors in the NO case is significantly lower than the number of good vectors in the YES case, they will not trouble us.
Our Techniques
We learned in the previous section that, in order to make our reduction work, it is necessary that our gadget (L † , t † , r † ) has exponentially more close vectors than short vectors. I.e., we need to find a family of gadgets that satisfies Eq. (1). Furthermore, we must somehow ensure that the number of impostors in the NO case is exponentially lower than the number of good vectors in the YES case.
The Integer Lattice, Θ p , and SETH Hardness. To prove Theorem 1.1, we take our gadget to be L † := Z n † , t † := (1/2, . . . , 1/2) ∈ R n † , and
, we ensure that there simply are no impostors in the NO instance (i.e., when ∥y − t ∥ p > r , we can never have 8 To prove that our reduction works, we wish to show that the ratio
is (exponentially) large. Of course, the numerator is easy to calculate. It is |{0, 1} n † | = 2 n † . So, we wish to prove that
Unfortunately, Eq. (2) does not hold for all ℓ p norms. For example, for p = 2, consider the points in {−1, 0, 1} n † with n † /4 non-zero coordinates, which have ℓ 2 norm r † . There are
such points. (In fact, this is a reasonable estimate for the exact value
0891, as we show in [3] , following Mazo and Odlyzko [32] .) However, it is relatively easy to see that the number of short vectors
is decreasing in p. So, one might hope that Eq. (2) holds for slightly larger p.
To prove this, we wish to find a good upper bound on the number of integer points in a centered ℓ p ball, N p (Z n † , r † , 0). A very nice way to do this uses the function
for τ > 0 [17, 32] . 9 Notice that
In particular,
Rearranging and taking the infimum over τ , we see that
We can relatively easily compute this value numerically and see that it is less than 2 n † for p > p 0 ≈ 2.1397. (Indeed, we will see below that there is a nearly matching lower bound in a more general context. So, Eq. (3) is quite tight.)
To prove Theorem 1.1, we can plug this very simple gadget into Khot's reduction described in Section 1.1 to reduce the SETHhard instances of CVP p from [12] to SVP p . To make the constant C p as tight as we can, we exploit the structure of these SETHhard CVP p instances. In particular, we observe that these instances themselves actually look quite a bit like our gadget, in that they are in some sense "small perturbations" of the integer lattice with the all one-halves point as the target. (See Section 4. This is in fact quite common for the CVP p instances resulting from hardness proofs.) This allows us to analyze the direct sum resulting from Khot's reduction very accurately in this case.
More Θ p for p > 2, and Gap-ETH Hardness. To extend our hardness results to all p > 2, we need to construct a gadget with exponentially more close vectors than short vectors for such p. We again choose our gadget lattice as Z n † , but we now take t † = (t, t, . . . , t ) ∈ R n † for some t ∈ (0, 1/2], and we take r † = C (n † ) 1/p for some constant C > 0.
Our previous gadget was quite convenient in that it was very easy to count the number of close vectors, but for arbitrary t and r † , it is no longer clear how to do this. Fortunately, Θ p can be used for this purpose. In particular, we define
By the same argument as before, we see that
But, we need a lower bound on N p (Z n † , r † , t † ). To that end, we prove that the above is actually quite tight. In particular,
I.e., Θ p tells us the number of integer points in an ℓ p ball up to lower-order terms. (Eq. (4) was already proven for p = 2 by Mazo and Odlyzko [32] and for all p by Elkies, Odlyzko, and Rush [17] .) It follows that there exists a t † and r † with exponentially more close integer vectors than short integer vectors in the ℓ p norm if and only if there exists a τ > 0 and t ∈ (0, 1/2] such that Θ p (τ ; t ) > Θ p (τ ; 0). We show that this holds if and only if p > 2. ( [17] contains a slightly different proof of the same fact.) I.e., we can construct a gadget satisfying Eq. (1).
Finally, we show that the existence of a gadget satisfying Eq. (1) actually implies the existence of a slightly stronger gadget that is sufficient to make the reduction go through. (See [3] .) In particular, this stronger gadget satisfies a "gap" version of Eq. (1), which is enough to bound the number of impostors resulting from Khot's reduction. In order to construct this new stronger gadget uniformly, we use some additional basic properties of the integer lattice.
To finish the proof, we start with the observation that an appropriate approximate version of Exact Set Cover problem is Gap-ETH hard. We then plug our gadget into Khot's reduction from Exact Set Cover to SVP p . (This reduction uses CVP p as an intermediate problem.)
Building Gadgets in ℓ 2 from Lattices with High Kissing Number. Finally, we show that a gadget satisfying (1) exists in the ℓ 2 norm as long as there is a family of lattices with exponentially large kissing number in the ℓ 2 norm. To prove this, we show how to choose a t † and
when L † is a member of such a family. Indeed, we show that it suffices to choose t † uniformly at random from vectors with an appropriate Euclidean length. By our discussion above , this would imply (non-uniform) Gap-ETH hardness of SVP 2 . And, by the reduction of Regev and Rosen from SVP p to SVP 2 [46] , this implies (non-uniform) Gap-ETH hardness of SVP p for 1 ≤ p ≤ 2.
A preliminary version of this work presented the above as a conditional result ("if there exists a family of lattices with exponentially large kissing number in the Euclidean norm, then SVP p is Gap-ETH hard. . . "). Shortly afterwards, to our great delight and surprise, Vlăduţ actually published a construction of such lattices, yielding an unconditional result [51] ! Unfortunately, this hardness reduction is non-uniform. Making it uniform might not be too difficult, but it seems to require a better understanding of the geometry of Vlăduţ's lattices.
Comparison with Other SVP p Hardness Results
There is by now a large body of work showing various forms of hardness for SVP p . A full survey of this is far beyond the scope of this work. See [33] for a more complete discussion of the early work on this topic and [34] for a more complete discussion of the later work. Here, we briefly discuss how our work fits into this larger context. As far as the authors know, all known hardness results for SVP p for finite p use as a gadget a lattice L † ⊂ R n † , target t † ∈ R n † , and radius r † > 0 such that
for some constant 0 < ε ≤ 1-i.e., a gadget with "more close vectors than short vectors." So, while our reductions are most similar to Khot's [26] (because we use Khot's sparsification technique to apply such gadgets), we share quite a bit in common with prior work. Our primary concern in this work is with the parameter ε, since these gadgets essentially allow us to reduce a CVP p instance on a rank-n lattice to an SVP p instance on a lattice of rank O (n 1/ε ). Indeed, our main contribution boils down to the construction and use of gadgets achieving ε = 1. Prior work was mostly concerned with other aspects of the reduction. E.g., after Ajtai's original proof [6] , a long series of works improved the approximation factor achieved [14, 22, 26, 33, 34] , culminating in hardness of γ -approximate SVP p for any γ ≤ n c / log log n [22, 34] . To achieve these higher approximation factors, these works placed more restrictions on the gadget, in addition to Eq. (5). E.g., Micciancio [33, 34] requires that the radius r † be shorter than the length of the shortest non-zero lattice vector in L † by a constant factor, as well as some additional structure on the lattice vectors that are close to t † . 10 Khot [26] requires a "gap" version of Eq. (5) together with additional restrictions that allow him to show that the lattices resulting from his reduction behave nicely under the tensor product (see also [22] ). Micciancio also focuses on minimizing the complexity of the reductions [33, 34] , showing unconditional randomized reductions with only one-sided error and deterministic reductions conditioned on certain number-theoretic conjectures. In contrast, Khot's sparsification technique (which we use) is necessarily randomized with two-sided error, and for p ≤ 2 we are only able to show non-uniform reductions. 10 One can actually show via sparsification that any gadget satisfying Eq. (1) implies the existence of a gadget satisfying the same equation with r † < λ 1 ( L † ), and even with r † < c λ 1 ( L † ) for some constant c < 1. However, using sparsification would defeat some of the purpose of Micciancio's work, since he is interested in avoiding randomness. Micciancio also speculates that the additional requirements that he places on the close vectors to the target is unnecessary [34] .
Directions for Future Work
Our dream result would be an explicit 2 Cn -time lower bound on approximate SVP 2 for the approximation factors γ most relevant to cryptography (at least, say, γ ≳ √ n) for some not-too-small explicit constant C > 0 (at least, say, C ≳ 1/20), under a reasonable complexity-theoretic assumption. This seems very far out of reach.
There are even complexity-theoretic barriers towards achieving this result, since SVP with these approximation factors cannot be NP hard unless the polynomial-time hierarchy collapses [5, 20, 42] . So, any proof of something this strong would presumably have to use a non-standard reduction. Nevertheless, we can still dream of such a result while proving more modest results. One potential approach would be to try to improve the approximation factor given by Theorems 1.2 and 1.3. (Even extending these theorems to explicit not-too-small constants would be an important result.) The currently known hardness of approximation proofs for SVP p with large approximation factor (e.g., a large constant or superconstant) work by "boosting" the approximation factor via repeatedly taking the tensor product [22, 26, 34] . I.e., given a family of lattices L ⊂ R d for which we know that SVP p is hard to approximate to within some small constant factor γ > 1, we argue that it is hard to approximate SVP p to within a factor of γ k on the tensor product L ⊗k for some k ≥ 2. Unfortunately, even a single tensor product increases the rank of the lattice quadratically. So, we cannot afford to use this technique directly to prove reasonable fine-grained hardness of approximation results. We therefore need a new technique (perhaps a way to control the blowup in dimension caused by tensor products).
Another seemingly easier direction would be to try to improve the constant C p in Theorem 1.1. Perhaps the simple gadget that we use to prove Theorem 1.1 is not the best possible. I.e., maybe there is another L † ⊂ R n † and t † ∈ R n † such that the ratio between N p (L † , r † , t † ) and N p (L † , r † , 0) is significantly larger than the ratio when L † = Z n † and t † = (1/2, . . . , 1/2), where
(And, perhaps we can find a gadget with an exponential ratio even for p ≤ p 0 .) Finally, in a completely different direction, we note that Theorem 1.1 provides some additional incentive to study algorithms for SVP p for p 2. We see two interesting approaches here. First, we can try to improve the hidden (very large) constant in the 2 O (n) running time of existing algorithms. In particular, it would be interesting to see how close we can get to the lower bound given by Theorem 1.1. To that end, Aggarwal and Mukhopadhyay recently showed faster algorithms for SVP ∞ [2] . 11 Second, we can try to more closely relate the problems relevant to cryptography to SVP p for p 2. While lattice-based cryptography is known to be secure if poly(n)-approximate SVP p is hard (for quantum computers) for any p ≥ 2 [42] , we have very little understanding of approximate SVP p for p 2. In particular, we have some understanding of the relationship between approximate SVP 2 and exact SVP 2 and even 11 They showed a 2 2.82d +o (d ) -time algorithm for SVP ∞ , a 3 d +o (d ) · (γ /(γ − 2)) d -time algorithm for γ -approximate SVP ∞ for γ > 2, and a heuristic algorithm for SVP ∞ that runs in time 2 0.62d +o (d ) . This dependence on the ambient dimension d as opposed to the rank n is to be expected. (Otherwise, their heuristic result would contradict the lower bound in [12] !) a tradeoff between time and approximation factor, but nothing non-trivial is known for p 2.
PRELIMINARIES
We denote column vectors x ∈ R d by bold lower-case letters. Matrices B ∈ R d ×n are denoted by bold upper-case letters, and we often think of a matrix as a list of column vectors. For x ∈ R d 1 , y ∈ R d 2 , we abuse notation a bit and write (x, y) ∈ R d 1 +d 2 when we should technically write (x T , y T ) T . For x ∈ R, we write
Logarithms are base e unless otherwise specified. Throughout this paper, we consider computational problems over R d . Formally, we should specify a method of representing arbitrary real numbers, and our running times should depend in some way on the bit length of these representations and the cost of doing arithmetic in this representation. For convenience, we ignore these issues (in particular assuming that basic arithmetic operations always have unit cost), and we simply note that all of our reductions remain efficient when instantiated with any reasonable representation of R. When we say that something is efficiently computable as a function of a dimension d, rank n, or cardinality m, we mean that it is computable in time poly(d ), poly(n), or poly(m), respectively (as opposed to polynomial in the logarithm of these numbers). 
Lattice Problems

Sparsification
A lattice vector y ∈ L is non-primitive if y = kx for some scalar k > 1 and lattice vector x ∈ L. Otherwise, y is primitive. (Notice that 0 is non-primitive.) For a radius r > 0, we write ξ p (L, r ) := |{y ∈ L : y is primitive and ∥y ∥ p ≤ r }|/2 for the number of primitive lattice vectors of length at most r in the ℓ p norm (counting ±y only once). We will use the following generalization of a sparsification theorem from [49] to all ℓ p norms.
Theorem 2.3 ([49, Proposition 4.2]).
There is an efficient algorithm that takes as input (a basis for) a lattice L ⊂ R d of rank n and a prime q ≥ 101 and outputs a sublattice L ′ ⊆ L of rank n such that for any radius r < q · λ
as long as N ≤ q/(20 log q), where N := ξ p (L, r ) is the number of primitive lattice vectors of length at most r in the ℓ p norm (up to the sign). Furthermore, if r ≥ qλ
1 (L ′ ) ≤ r always. We note in passing that the algorithm works by taking a random linear equation ⟨z, a⟩ ≡ 0 mod q for uniformly random z ∈ Z n q and setting L ′ to be the set of lattice vectors whose coordinates in some arbitrary fixed basis satisfy this linear equation. (Khot used the same technique.)
Fine-Grained Assumptions
Recall that, for integer k ≥ 2, a k-SAT formula is the conjunction of clauses, where each clause is the disjunction of k literals. I.e., k-SAT formulas have the form m i=1 k j=1 b i, j , where
Definition 2.4. For any k ≥ 2, the decision problem k-SAT is defined as follows. The input is a k-SAT formula. It is a YES instance if there exists an assignment to the variables that makes the formula evaluate to true and a NO instance otherwise.
Definition 2.5. For any k ≥ 2, the decision problem Max-k-SAT is defined as follows. The input is a k-SAT formula and an integer S ≥ 1. It is a YES instance if there exists an assignment to the variables such that at least S of the clauses evaluate to true and a NO instance otherwise.
Notice that k-SAT is a special case of Max-k-SAT. Impagliazzo and Paturi introduced the following celebrated and well-studied hypothesis concerning the fine-grained complexity of k-SAT [23] . Definition 2.6 (SETH). The (randomized) Strong Exponential Time Hypothesis ((randomized) SETH) asserts that, for every constant ε > 0, there exists a constant k ≥ 3 such that there is no 2 (1−ε )ntime (randomized) algorithm for k-SAT formulas with n variables. Definition 2.7. For η ∈ (0, 1) and k ≥ 2, the promise problem Gap-k-SAT η is defined as follows. The input is a k-SAT formula with m clauses. It is a YES instance if the formula is satisfiable, and it is a NO instance if the maximal number of simultaneously satisfiable clauses is strictly less than ηm.
Dinur [16] and Manurangsi and Raghavendra [31] recently introduced the following elegant assumption, called Gap-ETH. We also consider a non-uniform variant.
Definition 2.8 (Gap-ETH).
The (randomized) Gap-Exponential Time Hypothesis ((randomized) Gap-ETH) asserts that there exists a constant η ∈ (0, 1) such that there is no (randomized) 2 o (n) -time algorithm for Gap-3-SAT η over n variables.
Non-uniform Gap-ETH asserts that there is no circuit family of size 2 o (n) for Gap-3-SAT η over n variables.
A REDUCTION FROM A VARIANT OF CVP TO SVP
As we discussed in Section 1.1, the "naive reduction" from CVP p,γ ′ to SVP p,γ simply takes a CVP instance consisting of a basis B ∈ R d ×n for a lattice L ⊂ R d , target t ∈ R d , and distance r > 0, and constructs the SVP instance given by the basis for L ′ of the form 
If the input instance is a NO instance (i.e., if dist p (t, L) > γ ′ r ), then we call a non-zero vector y ′ = (y − zt, zs) ∈ L ′ annoying if ∥y ′ ∥ p ≤ γr ′ . As Khot showed, we can sparsify (as in Theorem 2.3) to make this naive reduction work as long as there are significantly fewer annoying vectors than close vectors. We therefore define a rather unnatural quantity below that exactly counts the number of annoying vectors in a NO instance.
For 1 ≤ p < ∞, and γ ≥ 1, a lattice L ⊂ R d , target t ∈ R n , and distances r , s > 0, we define 12
r,s,γ does in fact count the number of annoying vectors resulting from the above reduction (up to sign). In particular, the summand
is the number of vectors y ′ = (y − zt, zs) ∈ L of length at most γr ′ for some fixed z.
We now define the variant of CVP p on which this sparsificationbased reduction works. 
Notice that the YES and NO instances of (A, G)-CVP p,γ are dis- 13 We drop the
Having defined (A, G)-CVP p,γ specifically so that we can reduce it to SVP p,γ , we now present the reduction from (A, G)-CVP p,γ to SVP p,γ . It essentially follows from the definition of A (p ) r,s,γ together with Theorem 2.3. Theorem 3.2. For 1 ≤ p < ∞ and efficiently computable A = A(n) ≥ 1, G = G (n) ≥ 1000A(n), and γ = γ (n) ≥ 1, there is a (randomized) reduction from (A, G)-CVP p,γ on a lattice with rank n in d dimensions to SVP p,γ on a lattice with rank n + 1 in d + 1 dimensions that runs in time poly(d, log A, log G).
Proof. On input a basis B for a lattice L ⊂ R n , a target vector t ∈ R n , and distances r , s > 0, the reduction does the following. Let L ′ be the lattice generated by B ′ := B −t 0 s , 12 We should perhaps write ⌊γ (r p /s p + 1) 1/p ⌋ for the upper bound of summation, but we omit the floor function here and elsewhere to make these expressions slightly less ugly. 13 We find it convenient to define the problem even for A ≥ G because it will not always be clear which of the two values is larger. Our results will always be vacuous when A ≥ G. E.g., Theroem 3.2 requires G ≫ A. The running time is clear, as is the fact that the reduction increases both the dimension and rank by exactly one.
If the input instance is a YES instance, then the number of vectors in L ′ of the form (v − t, s), where v ∈ L, is N p (L, r, t ) ≥ G. These are primitive vectors in L ′ and have length at most r ′ (and there is no pair ±y in this collection of vectors). I.e., there are at least M/10 primitive lattice vectors in L ′ of length at most r ′ , and it follows from Theorem 2.3 that
Then, by the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound, the oracle will output YES except with probability exp(−Ω(d )), as needed.
If the input instance is a NO instance, then notice the number of primitive vectors in L ′ of length at most γr ′ is at most A 
The result again follows by the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound. □
SETH-HARDNESS OF THIS VARIANT OF CVP (AND THEREFORE SVP)
We now show that (A, G)-CVP p is SETH-hard. We first observe that the SETH-hard CVP p instances from [12] "have a copy of Z n embedded in them." This fact will allow us to compute A (p ) r,s quite accurately. (For technical reasons, for each k ≥ 3, the reduction in Theorem 4.1 fails on a finite but unspecified set of values p. The set of failure points unfortunately includes even integers p < k, but the reduction is known to succeed for all odd integers p ≥ 1. See [12] for more discussion about the set of included and excluded values of p.) 
